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ABSTRACT 
Communication is important in science. It not only serves as a way  
to let people know about science but also helps in doing science 
itself, thus at times enabling learners and practitioners of science  
to know about the nature of science itself. In The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn talks about ‘communication 
break’ during periods of scientific crisis. Often, even during periods 
of “normal science” (as used by Kuhn), communicating science  
is a challenge, while still keeping intact the intended meaning. The 
incommensurability of meaning may lead to a communication break. 
Such a situation leads to a deadlock and resolving such debates 
becomes very difficult. This also takes a toll on the communication of 
the general idea of science being debated to the students, general 
public and even other researchers.  
Using ‘Do genes encode information about phenotypic traits?’ a 
debate published in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (ed. 
Hitchcock C. 2004), I try to look into how, even when both the 
debaters seem to understand the science correctly, do they reach at 
different conclusions in their debate. I also try to provide a solution to 
the debate, by looking at the relationship between the concepts being 
talked about in the debate. Resolving such debates is necessary as the 
science that forms the background of the debate is fairly old and 
robust and has made its way into textbooks and popular science 
journals long back. Thus, such debates may create negative 
perceptions among the students and general public, about the 
information being communicated to them in textbooks and popular 
science magazines, thus hindering further communication.    
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Breaks in communication may lead to debates 
Communication is important for the advancement of knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge is regarded as the truest form of knowledge 
accepted in current times. Communication, thus, is important  
for the advancement of science. It also gives the practitioners of 
science i.e. scientists, a view into the nature of science (Nielsen, 
2013).  
Science, in order to be communicated effectively must 
‘travel’ well into the society. Travel not only in space but also in 
time. To travel thus, science needs to become a part of social 
interaction, which in essence requires commensurable meanings. 
In social interaction, semantic meanings (Carnap, 1975) and 
semiotic meanings (Haralambos and Heald, 1981) have been 
given utmost importance. Breaks in communication happen 
when the intended meaning of the term is not clear to the 
audience. This situation may lead to unnecessary debates to 
arise, even when both the sides involved in communication are 
clear about the knowledge (or the science) being discussed. 
The debate in question here has been taken from Hitchcock, 
2004. In this debate both the debaters are Philosophers of 
Science. Sahotra Sarkar is a professor at the Department of 
Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin. The other 
debater, Peter Godfrey-Smith is a professor in the School of 
History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney. The 
debate entitled ‘Do genes encode information about phenotypic 
traits?’ has both these eminent philosophers engrossed at mainly 
two points: 
1. Meaning of the term ‘information’ as coded by genes 
2. Whether by coding for proteins by extension mean coding 
for phenotypic traits 
In a way then, this debate arises due to different ways in 
which ‘the communication at molecular level’ has been 
communicated! It is important to note that communication at the 
molecular level is semiotic in nature and so is better explained 
by the ‘communication theory’ of Shannon (1948). Whereas 
when the debaters talk about communication at the molecular 
level, they indulge in semantic communication, the rules of 
which have been explained by Carnap (1975) in some detail. 
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Information transfer at the molecular level: understanding 
the debate 
The basics of molecular biology are well explained in present 
times, so we cannot expect that the debate arose due to a science 
being new or a lack of understanding in the basic processes in 
molecular biology. The debate seems to arise from difference in 
understanding of the terms ‘information’ and ‘phenotype’, thus, 
making it an interesting matter to look into more closely. 
The central dogma of molecular biology clearly states that 
genetic information flows from nucleic acid to protein but not 
vice versa (Crick, 1970). After the postulates of the central 
dogma were set out, over the next three decades enough work 
has been done to detail the mechanisms and machinery of the 
coding of information from nucleic acids to proteins.  
Communication at the molecular level is semiotic in nature 
(Hitchcock, 2004 pp. 261-262). This is clearly shown by the 
evolution of a genetic code that requires ‘decoding’ the 
information contained in the nucleic acids (DNA) to be 
communicated through mRNA to the tRNA to form proteins. 
The communication theory (Shannon, 1948), briefly states that 
the raw message, from an information source is transmitted 
through a channel after being transformed by a transmitter. The 
receiver translates the signal to the original message as it reaches 
the destination. The noise factor is like an entropy factor and is 
present at the level of the channel. This description of 
communication theory sounds convincing in the context of 
genetic information as it is indeed communicated to the tRNA to 
form proteins.  
However, looking more closely there are two major 
differences. One, the specificity on genetic information is not 
determined at the channel level i.e. the mRNA level. It is 
determined beforehand by the genetic code and directly 
manifests itself at the translation stage when tRNA adds amino 
acids to form an elongated primary polypeptide, the precursor to 
the protein. Two, in the communication theory, the information 
that is coded is again decoded into the original form at the 
receiving end whereas at the molecular level, the genetic 
information (nucleotide sequences) that is coded is decoded in 
98 JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC TEMPER, VOL 8(1&2), JAN-JUNE 2020 
the form of amino acid sequences at the receiving end. Both the 
polymeric molecules viz. nucleotide sequences and amino acid 
sequences are very different both structurally and functionally 
and thus have different physical and chemical properties. 
Therefore Sarkar, in Hitchcock (2004 pp. 262), goes beyond 
the communication theory to discuss the semiotic aspects of 
genetic information as coded and decoded in molecular biology. 
He later explains that in molecular biology, the coding  
and related aspects are empirical, not conceptual relations 
(Hitchcock, 2004 pp. 269). Further, he mentions that 
environmental factors play a role (less so in prokaryotic genetics 
than eukaryotic genetics) in genes coding for protein. Thus, a 
trait (more technically phenotype) is defined as a sum total of the 
interaction between genes (more technically genotype) and 
environment. Also, the proteins (and their functions) are 
themselves affected by the environment. Thus, he concluded that 
almost always, the genes code information for the trait, not the 
protein; as the trait, in the end is a product of genetic 
information.  
Godfrey-Smith, in Hitchcock (2004 pp. 279), seems to pick 
up the point made by Sarkar, but in a very different manner.  
He seems to be saying that since the trait is a product of 
interactions between genes and the environment, genes only 
code for proteins and nothing further. Once the protein is coded 
for, it interacts with other molecules (including both nucleic 
acids and proteins) and the environment to express the trait or 
the phenotype. Godfrey-Smith, first, distinguishes between the 
two senses of the term ‘information’. He illustrates that 
information may mean any correlations between the two states in 
question e.g. dark clouds contain information about rain 
(Hitchcock, 2004 pp. 276). The second sense of information is as 
a representation of a concept and carrying a semantic content 
about that concept, e.g. considering rings in the trunk of a tree to 
contain information about the age of the tree. He says that rings 
of tree in this case are not representation of the life of the tree. 
They are just indicators useful to observers. Secondly, he also 
discusses what is meant by the term ‘phenotypic trait’ in the 
context of the present debate. He explains that in the broad sense 
‘phenotype’ means any physical or chemical property of the 
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organism. This includes proteins as well as the transcription and 
translation machinery also. But he makes it clear that for the 
purpose of the debate, he means the overall affect that the 
proteins have on organisms (e.g. shape, size, color, height etc.) 
(Hitchcock, 2004 pp. 276). From the above discussion it  
appears that both the philosophers are ending with the same 
argument that proteins themselves are not phenotypes. But they 
conclude differently as their definition of ‘information’ is 
different. Sarkar takes the indication form of information to 
mean that genes code for information regarding phenotype  
just like rings of a tree ‘code’ for information regarding the  
age of the tree. Godfrey-Smith on the other hand uses the 
correlational form of information, leading to a conclusion that 
genes code information for just manufacturing proteins, by the 
cellular machinery. The phenotype, according to him develops 
due to interaction of proteins with each other and with the 
environment.  
 
Changes in intended meanings may lead to communication 
breaks 
May Brodbeck, in her essay titled ‘Meaning and Action’ 
(Nidditch, 1968 pp. 123), has explained that the intended 
meaning (m3) of a term may be different from the conventional 
meaning (m1) or even factual meaning (m2) of the term. Here,  
it is important to understand that the debate itself has arisen due 
to differences in m3 i.e. intended meaning of the term 
‘information’. This shows the importance of commensurability 
of intended meanings while communicating science.  
Thomas S. Kuhn, in his famous essay The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, says: “They speak, (that is), from what I have called 
incommensurable viewpoints.” (Kuhn, 1994 pp. 200). Here he is 
describing a situation that has arisen as a result of a crisis in a 
scientific field. He is referring to two scientists, proponents of 
two different theories, arguing about which theory can lay the 
claim to be the new paradigm. However, as exemplified by the 
presently mentioned debate, such incommensurable viewpoints 
can arise even during the periods of normal science, where  
the argument is not about a new paradigm but simply of 
understanding and communicating the intended meaning of the 
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term ‘information’ correctly and hence concluding whether 
genes code information for phenotypic traits or not. 
Since the intended meaning m3 of the term ‘information’ has 
been understood very differently by both the philosophers, the 
overall incommensurability of their viewpoints has arisen, giving 
rise to the debate. This has ultimately led both of them to answer 
the final question i.e. ‘whether genes code information for 
phenotypic traits?’ very differently. It is important to note that 
the different final answer is a result of the factual meaning m2, of 
‘phenotypic trait’, being changed in each case depending upon 
the intended meaning m3, of ‘information’.  
Since the debate has arisen due to a difference in the 
intended meaning of the terms ‘information’ and ‘phenotype’, 
the debaters find themselves coming to different end results even 
though both are talking about the similar conclusion. This lack of 
commensurability in the meaning of the terms makes it difficult 
to resolve the debate. Thus, we have to look at the debate from 
an angle of relationships between the theories being debated 
about. ‘Information’, as used by the debaters in the present 
context, is a concept in molecular biology. Whereas phenotypic 
traits, as used by debaters is an older concept, a part of classical 
Mendelian genetics.  
The concepts of information and phenotype need to be 
accessed carefully to provide a possible solution to the ongoing 
debate. One possible reason that may be leading the two debaters 
to form incommensurable meanings of the terms is the apparent 
reduction of the concepts of classical genetics to the terms in 
molecular biology. Let us have a look at how reduction of 
concepts of fields within biology can lead to a perception that 
may cause clash between two intended meanings of a term 
(factual or conceptual). 
 
Relationship between complex scientific theories 
It has often been observed that scientists try to reduce complex 
problems and try to fit them in categories, in order to study them 
in some detail. While the original intent of reduction was 
creating ease of analysis of complex systems, over time 
reduction has come to mean something different from that 
captured in formal philosophical accounts. Often even the most 
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seasoned scientists and philosophers of science have started 
looking at one to one correspondence between terms that have 
been used to describe the concepts of two different fields within 
a subject. In biology, there is often an attempt to reduce the 
terms of classical Mendelian genetics to molecular biology. But 
such reductions, though they may help in elucidating a concept, 
have led to complexities due to attempts of one to one literal 
mapping of components of former with the latter. 
“Even if all gross phenotypic traits are translated into 
molecularly characterized traits, the relations between 
Mendelian and molecular predicate terms express 
prohibitively complex, many-many relations. Phenomena 
characterized by a single Mendelian predicate term can 
be produced by several different types of molecular 
mechanisms. Hence, any reduction will be complex. 
Conversely, the same types of molecular mechanisms can 
produce phenomena that must be characterized by 
different Mendelian predicate terms. Hence, reduction is 
impossible.” (Hull 1974, pp. 39 in Darden, 2006 pp. 104)  
Therefore, formal reductionism does not work in complex 
biological theories. Some researchers argue that reductionism 
may be used for explanatory purposes. This kind of reduction 
may help in a search for lower level mechanism to explain an 
upper level phenomenon. An example may be molecular biology 
being used to explain complex phenomena at the cellular level. 
There are several instances of such explanatory reductionism, the 
most famous being that of “crossing over” of chromosomes 
during meiosis being explained by Holliday model of general 
molecular recombination.  It often appears that there is a kind  
of an elegant unification between theories of one or more  
than one fields of biology. One might be tempted to look at the 
above example in a way that what happens at the level of 
chromosomes in the cells, the same phenomenon happens at the 
level of DNA during molecular recombination. Another very 
important example is that of the analogy between chromosome 
replication and DNA replication to correspond perfectly. 
However, when one goes into the details of molecular biology, 
the details of the mechanisms tend to destroy the apparent 
elegant unification. 
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“Such unification would be lost if attention was focused 
on the gory details at the molecular level. The 
cytological level thus constituted an ‘autonomous level 
of biological explanation’” (Kitcher 1984, pp. 371 in 
Darden, 2006 pp. 107). 
Therefore, reduction of biological theories to explain 
complex behavior of one through another is not a very useful 
approach. One might instead choose to look at the relationship 
between the various theories instead of trying to reduce one to 
the other. Different mechanisms have different ‘working entities’ 
and operate at different times and in different spaces. To discern 
a mechanism it is important to correctly find the working entities 
and the level at which they are operating (Darden, 2006 pp. 108). 
It is not surprising that genes are not the working entities in 
any hereditary mechanism except for gene expression, the 
process that leads to the formation of proteins. It is important to 
understand that molecular biology concepts are not reduced 
versions of the concepts of classical genetics; instead molecular 
biology comes up with mechanistic schemas to explain the 
concepts of classical genetics. One must therefore guard against 
the temptation of using interchangeably the concepts and 
molecules of molecular biology and the theoretical concepts of 
classical genetics. For example, the expression of a protein does 
not necessarily mean the expression of a ‘phenotypic trait’, the 
former being a molecular entity and the latter a theoretical 
concept of classical genetics.  
Moreover, inter-field theories like chromosome theory have 
linked ‘genes’ and ‘chromosomes’ as a part-whole relationship. 
And the operon theory in bacterial genetics has linked the gene 
expression (molecular biology) to metabolite use (biochemistry) 
in a cause-effect relationship. Instead of reduction on one 
complex system to another, theories in biology may be better 
seen as bridging the two fields e.g. Classical genetics and 
Molecular biology (Darden, 2006 pp. 145). 
 
An attempt to solve the debate 
Using the above discussion about relationship between theories 
of different fields in biology, let us try to look at our debate ‘Do 
genes encode information about phenotypic traits?’ As already 
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mentioned, the debate arises due to difference in intended 
meanings of terms ‘information’ and ‘phenotypic trait’ as used 
by the debaters Sahotra Sarkar and Peter Godfrey-Smith. When 
we look at the concept of phenotypic trait and try to establish its 
relation to the molecular result of gene expression, it is clear that 
‘trait’ is just a theoretical concept of classical genetics. However, 
protein is a macromolecule that is produced as a result of 
molecular biology mechanism. Therefore, to say that ‘genes code 
information about proteins’ and ‘genes code information about 
phenotypic trait’ are the same thing would be incorrect.  
A protein, once manufactured by the molecular machinery, is 
exposed to the cellular environment.  
From this point onwards, the gene is not a ‘working entity’ 
in any mechanisms that the protein takes part in, to determine the 
overall phenotype. The ‘phenotypic trait’ is thus a collective 
outcome of multiple proteins coming together, the immediate 
cellular environment and the changes that take place at the level 
of tissue, organ and even organism. The final determination of 
the ‘phenotypic trait’ is when the organism interacts with the 
natural environment. In none of these processes, the gene is the 
working entity. 
Therefore, the claim that ‘genes code information for 
phenotypic trait’ is not a valid statement to make. Resolving this 
debate through the argument of both the debaters was very 
difficult due to difference in intended meanings of certain terms. 
Instead, looking at the debate from the point of view of the 
relations between the two terms ‘proteins’ and ‘phenotypic traits’ 
helps us to reach a conclusion that the two terms are not the 
same and that protein expression explains the molecule level 
mechanistic details of phenotypic trait but the genes have no role 
to play in determining the final outcome of a phenotypic trait. 
 
Conclusion 
Such debates are very important to resolve as molecular biology 
is a science that is already in public domain. It is not the case of 
a crisis, a stage for scientific revolution, to select a new 
paradigmatic theory, as meant by Kuhn (Kuhn, 1994). It is 
taught to students in schools and institutions and even the 
common populace is interested in knowing about molecular 
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biology and genetic engineering, making it ‘normal science’. 
This debate is a result of the incommensurable intended meaning 
that both the debaters have given to the terms ‘information’ and 
‘phenotypic traits’. A debate around such an elementary question 
might raise some doubts about the science or some specific 
theories within the broad subject.  
When a debate arises due to incommensurable intended 
meaning, it is often futile to convince the other party about the 
meaning, as intended by one party. In such a case, it is useful to 
look at the major contributors of incommensurability, from a 
different perspective. Here, rather than going into the details of 
intentions and meanings, one possible solution to the debate was 
suggested by looking at it from the perspective of relationships 
between concepts of various theories within a field of scientific 
inquiry.  The philosophers of science or practicing scientists 
should try to resolve such debates among them so as to 
effectively communicate the science further into the public 
domain. It is important to resolve the debate, as this is essential 
for communicating science.   
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